Temporary Project Cultures

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INTRODUCTION
As part of the Doctor of Project Management program at RMIT University, research was undertaken to explore the hypothesis that there are cross-cultural leadership attributes, or dimensions, that are universally effective, regardless of culture. This paper provides a partial summary of that research, and of the resulting Cross-Cultural Leadership Intelligence (XLQ) model and tests the XLQ model on three actual international projects.

This paper applies the XLQ concept to address the culture of temporary project organizations, and why people emulate the behavior of a leader. As will be suggested XLQ coupled with this innate imitative behavior, can inspire the desire to follow, can imbue leadership behavior in others, can facilitate success on the project, and can lead to sustainable success on future projects.

A leader with high XLQ must have a solid understanding of herself or himself and have a high degree of emotional intelligence, or EQ (Goleman 1996a), for to lead others one must first know oneself. The externalization of this intelligence is leadership behavior, and the persona that is seen by the stakeholders on a project. The conduct of a leader, her behavior, will dictate how the stakeholders perceive and resonate with the PM. The stakeholders will monitor the PM to see that actions and behavior match rhetoric.

Global markets are forcing increased competition, flatter organizations, international teams, partnerships and alliances, and virtual teams. It is now common to have multi-cultural teams located in multiple countries that communicate and perform the project work via the internet. It is also more common to find such projects led by a project manager (PM) from non-western countries. Projects are unique endeavors (often with a short cycle time, and challenging budgets), and it is common for a PM to be assigned to a project at the start of the execution phase, after the planning has been performed by others. When this is the case the PM must quickly build and motivate the TPO to meet the goals and objectives of the project. Couple this with the standard use of multi-cultural virtual teams and the result is a dynamic environment, where XLQ skills are essential. Experience confirms that there is seldom little time for training and the exploration of political, social, cultural, contractual, and technological issues - the team must hit the ground running.

The original research was conducted by Dr. Grisham, and the reflective practice was supplied by Mr. Srinivasan. Reflective practice (Schön 1983) has a long established acceptance in the management literature as a valid research methodology. Its original roots lie in action learning through change management (Lewin 1947) and sensemaking, literally contemplating and reflection upon action in order to make logical sense out of

events (Weick 1995; Weick 2001). This approach has facilitated more formal research methods revolving around reflective practice, either as passive observer or more active participant in change cycles (Coghlan and Brannick 2005), or being more intimately involved in the process through experiential learning.

The paper begins with a brief overview of the thinking on TPO's. That is followed by a summary of the research on XLQ and the model. It then explores some of the current research on emulation (when this behavior begins, and why people imitate the actions of others), and tests the XLQ model in practice. In closing the paper will connect XLQ to the TPO and emulation, will suggest how a PM can utilize this information to lead in today's international market, and will propose areas of future study.

TPO's

Firms need strong leadership (trust, power, empathy, and communications) to create and nurture a knowledge environment. As has been pointed out, systems that help the feed forward/feed back of knowledge in a freely flowing manner can enhance trust (Lawrence, Mauws et al. 2005), and trust is the hub of the XLQ model. To create and nurture a knowledge environment, the business leaders of the respective firms need to demonstrate the importance of knowledge to the firm, and to instill the pursuit and sharing of knowledge as a passion into everyone in the firm. The PM must then nurture this same attitude in the TPO, and must create time for people to share their knowledge (von Krough, Ichijo et al. 2000).

In a well referenced paper on temporary organizations Grabher concludes (2004) (Pg. 211) that: "the formation and operation of projects essentially relies on a societal infrastructure which is built on involving a diverse range of collaborators, roles and straightforward substitution but have to be regarded in terms of interdependence. 'Cool' projects, indeed, rely on 'boring' institutions." Grabhner's idea is to use the 'boring' institutional long-term relationship to build trust in a short-term (transactional) organization.

Experience shows that the initiating and planning for an international project will require approximately the same amount of time as does the actual execution and close-out. The structure of the contract and of the resulting TPO, is established in the initiating and planning phases of the project life cycle, well before the execution of the project begins. Unfortunately, experience also shows that frequently the lead project manager is parachuted into the project, along with the performing organiztions at the end of the planning phase. This pressures the international project manager to design, build, and motivate the TPO concurrent with the execution of the project. This paper suggests such an approach will seriously hamper, if not kill, the ability of the lead project manager to build a TPO and a team culture.

The contract structure and structure of the TPO are the seeds of open communications, team culture, and trust. These structures will determine how effective the participants can in fact be in successfully completing the project. That is to say, the structures can limit the abilities of the parties to work together. The structure of a TPO is established, or approved, by the customer. On competitive publicly bid projects, the customer mandates in a unilateral manner the TPO in the general and special conditions. This may

be implicit in the communication protocols described, or explicit in the contractual relationships defined. At the other extreme, on negotiated design-build projects all of the participants will jointly engage in the design of the contract and TPO structure. That is not to imply that it will be well designed, but rather that it is a participatory rather than an unilateral approach. The parties have an opportunity to decide what type of organization will be utilized on the project, how communications will be conducted, how knowledge will be shared, and (most frequently implicitly) what the culture will be for the TPO.

There has been some work on temporary project organizations (TPO's) as they relate to project management including (Mintzberg 1983); (Toffler 1997); (Grisham and Srinivasan 2007); (Winter, Smith et al. 2006); (DeFillipi and Arthur 1998); (Grabher 2004); (Brown and Duguid 1996); (Turner and Mueller 2003); (Jensen, Johansson et al. 2006); (Hastings 1995). According to DeFillippi and Arthur reputation, relationships, and heavy reliance on the value chain are essential needs for temporary project organizations. Grabher concluded that (Pg. 211): "The formation and operation of projects essentially relies on a societal infrastructure which is built on and around networks, localities, institutions and firms." Brown and Duguid found that team members are enculturated by the telling of stories that are community-appropriate. Turner and Müeller concluded that a project manager functions a the chief executive officer of a TPO, and that the primary role of the lead project manager is to set goals and objectives, and to motivate team members, not to focus on planning and execution - we prefer the term lead project manager rather than TPO. This view is more representative of international project mangement realities in the 21st century, and argues for early involvement of the lead project manager in the project.

Jensen Johansson et al. proposed a model for analyzing interactional uncertainty between organizations – especially important. They found that (Pg. 10): "If trust between project owner and project improves, the image of the project will certainly also improve. This may lead to changing conditions for and the position of the project." Trust is essential for the nurturing and growth of a TPO. Leadership of the project team is a fundamental requirement, as is the necessity for the international project manager to act as mentor and coach. The project manager must reinforce the culture of networking, imbue a culture of open dialogue, and sense problems that prevent people from operating effectively. Often, in our experience, the initiation and planning for a project is done without the participation of a professional project manager.

Cross-cultural Leadership Intelligence - XLQ
A good metaphor for project teams is that of a Temporary Project Organization (TPO), where the PM functions as the Chief Executive Officer (Mintzberg 1983); (Toffler 1997); (Winter, Smith et al. 2006); (Grisham and Srinivasan 2007). TPO's are made up of the separate companies that come together, one time, to perform an international project. As each company has a different culture and different goals and objectives, the stakeholders have different cultural values and perspectives. The lead PM must define the common goals and objectives, and then lead the team toward these project wide goals, quickly. When coupled with international market pressure, this requires that the lead PM have a high degree of XLQ, especially if the project is large and complex.

Given these considerations, practical experience confirmed the compelling need for a cross-cultural leadership model that was universally effective for PMs, based on broad horizontal research. As Henrie and Sousa-Poza (2005) put it (Pg. 5): "as the Project Management literature indicates, researchers will need to incorporate theories and concepts, developed in other disciplines, to build Project Management-specific culture based theories and research methods. To overcome the lack of available culture information within the areas surveyed, the project manager must expand his or her reading and learning to other culture-based discipline areas."

Therefore, the goal of the thesis was to perform a broad multidisciplinary review of the research and thinking about leadership and culture. The first step was to explore the existing literature on culture, leadership, knowledge transfer, and conflict management. The research looked at work in the fields of psychology, sociology, anthropology, organizational behavior, literature, philosophy, religion, and more.

Because of the diversity of contextual knowledge base, an exegetical approach was selected. Others (Mayo and Nohria 2005) have utilized this approach in similar conditions, especially when the topic demands a more holistic approach. The word exegesis means *to draw the meaning out of* a given text. The thesis maintained each author's use of their own terminology, the context of their discipline, and the cultural context of their studies. Once the research was compiled, an exegetical analysis was performed to draw the meaning out of the text. This resulted in a list of synonyms utilized by the different authors. These synonyms were then related back to the GLOBE study (Den Hartog, House et al. 1999), which served as a benchmark for the results of the study; the GLOBE study was a recent broad international study of culture and leadership. The next step was to discover the natural patterns and groupings of terminology that emerged, and to codify them in a matrix using the original author's terminology, the GLOBE terminology, and my own experience. The last step was to connect these themes to the XLQ dimensions as shown in Table 1. Testing of the hypothesis was done with a Delphi panel of 23 experts with well over 600 years of combined international experience. All of the dimensions, descriptors, and sub-descriptors were confirmed by the panel. The result of the thesis was the XLQ Model that is shown in Figure 1.

The hub of the steering wheel is trust, for without it leadership is not possible. The spokes of the wheel are transformation, communication, power, and empathy and they support the structure of the wheel. The circumference is culture, and without it the wheel would not exist, and would not be effective. The lubricant for the wheel is conflict management, which can be used to stimulate creativity or if not managed can cause strife and discontent.   The model assumes that a leader has high XLQ, and knowledge of the goals and objectives of the stakeholders and of the project.   A weakness in any

Figure 1 - XLQ Model

component will reduce the effectiveness of the leader, and will potentially lead to an unsuccessful project.

International project management, as noted above, has suffered from a lack of a codified approach to the training of people to work in multi-cultural environments. Albeit there are cultural training programs for business, most focus on long term endeavors, not TPO's. The XLQ model provides a simple outline of leadership attributes that can be utilized to structure assessment and training for PMs in a consistent and systematized manner. For the model, it does not matter if the PM was born in China and raised in the USA, or born in the USA and raised in Japan since it is a universal, or *etic*, model (Triandis and Gelfand 1998). So training for leadership skills in Malaysia or Botswana or Tokyo can be structured in the same way, with the emphasis on the XLQ leadership dimensions.

Culture has been defined by Darlington (1996) who quoted a definition of culture by Margaret Mead (1955)[1] as (Pg. 33): "a body of learned behavior, a collection of beliefs, habits and traditions, shared by a group of people and successively learned by people who enter the society." Substitute the word project team for society, and the definition is appropriate for International Project Management. Also, the Mead definition functions well for individual culture, team culture, societal culture, corporate culture, and TPO culture.

Transformation is required if the various firms or organizations are to feel comfortable adapting their existing procedures to blend with those of the other participants on a project. The judicious exercise of position power by the lead PM is required in the empowerment of the project managers from each of the participant firms and organizations. Empathy is required to show that the leader has a demonstrable, and

Table 1 - XLQ Dimensions (Grisham)

immutable, concern for the viewpoints of all the other participants in the TPO.

To nourish and grow a TPO team culture requires effective, open, persistent, and patient communications. Team cultures coalesce around a PM who can establish, and articulate, goals and objectives, and who can inspire the team to *achieve beyond expectations*, particularly those of the individual participants themselves. One of the many ways of nurturing this growth is through metaphor, poetry, and storytelling (Grisham 2006a). In TPO's there is often little time to grow a team culture, and the use of metaphor and storytelling by the PM, and about the PM, can accelerate the growth.

To build and nurture a TPO team culture requires that the leader possess and utilize all of the XQL dimensions shown in Table 1. If the stakeholders feel like a team, then they will be able to develop a more intimate relationship, which will in turn enable open and productive communications, knowledge sharing, and more successful projects.

The XLQ model provides the dimensions for cross-cultural leadership, but what of the behavior that it can inspire in others? The following section provides a brief look into the psychological and biological research that has been undertaken to look at why and how

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[1] Note – The Darlington reference was from the 1951 version of the 1955 reference from Mead.

XLQ Dimension	Descriptors	Sub-Descriptors
Trust	Care and Concern	Esteem, Face
	Character	Honesty & Integrity, Duty & Loyalty, Admiration
	Competence	Technical, Jugement
	Dependability	Predictability, Commitments
	Fearlessness	Confidence, Self-Sacrifice
	Humaneness	Tolerance, Respect
	Integrator	Goals, Cohesiveness
	Integrity & Ethics	Values, Ethics
	Truth & Justice	Fairness, Candor
Empathy	Cultural Intelligence	Metaphors, Customs
	Humaneness	Compassion, Consideration
	Servant Leadership	Self Sacrifice, Empowerment
Transformation	Inspiration	Expectations, Mentoring
	Charisma	Decisive, Uniqueness
	Risk Change	Desire to change, Security
	Vision	Foresight, Goals
Power	Knowledge Power	Sharing knowledge, Mentor
	Position Power	Legitimate, Political
	Power Distance	Locust, Communitinarism
	Referent Power	Bravery, Warmth
	Reward & Punishment Power	Coersive, Reward
Communication	Adaptability	Understanding, Communication
	Competence	Cultural, Communication, Listening
	Creativity	Storytelling, Metaphor
	Patience	Time, Repetition
	Sensitivity	Facework
	Wisdom	Accuracy, Culture
	Conflict Management	Knowledge, Listening, Preparation

people imitate one another. A leader must lead by example, by establishing a portfolio of actions that can be emulated by followers, and can become legend.

Emulation

Meltzoff and Prinz (2002) provide a broad survey of the state of research on imitation, and begin by summarizing (Pg. 36) imitation: "The 'likeme-ness' of others, first manifest in imitation, is a foundation for more mature forms of social cognition that depend on the felt equivalence between self and other. The Golden Rule, 'Treat thy neighbor as thy Self' at first occurs in action, through imitation. Without an imitative mind, we might not develop this moral mind. Imitation is the bud, and empathy and moral sentiments are the ripened fruit – born from years of interaction with other people already recognized to be 'like me.' To the human infant, another person is not an alien, but a kindred spirit – not an 'It' but an embryonic 'Thou'."

Meltzoff and Prinz point to numerous clinical tests that demonstrate that children not only learn to mimic behavior and actions, but also understand the underlying goals of those actions. People develop the habit of imitating behavior, and intention, from childhood. For a leader this is critically important, for it suggests that followers will copy

not only the physical actions, but will adopt what they believe to be the underlying emotional and ethical motivations. Trust, empathy, transformation, power, and communication all play a role.

Kinnunen (1996), and Tarde (1903) believe that social change and the development of culture requires the penetration of inventions (evolution), and that inventions diffuse by process of imitation. Tarde believed that the more people interact, the more likely inventions will appear, and saw imitation as part of a universal law of repetition in nature and in humankind. Bandura, Ross et al. (1963) found that imitation can produce innovation in social behavior as well as invention. Transformation of teams and followers (empowerment, vision, creativity, values, etc.) can be facilitated by this natural tendency of people.

Recent research into mirror neurons has uncovered some remarkable biological aspects of imitation. Iacoboni, Molnar-Szakacs et al. (2005) reported that work with monkeys has shown that mirror neurons fire when object directed actions by an animal, like grasping or manipulating, occur (Rizzolatti, Fadiga et al. 1996). It has also been found that mirror neurons fire when an animal observes another animal performing the same class of action. Other research has shown that the mirror neurons also fire when the sound of an action occurs in the dark (Kohler, Keysers et al. 2002).

The work of Iacoboni, Molnar-Szakacs et al. focused on human subjects and tested the relationship between context, action and intention. Their findings suggest that coding (creating the neuron pathways) the intention associated with the actions of others is formed by mirror neurons, and that these neurons suggest motor acts that are likely to follow in a given context. They also found that intention is ascribed by inference from the action and context. This research suggests that imitation of actions is "wired" in along with the intention of the action. For a leader then it is important that the context and intention are made clear when actions are taken. If people have a physiological disposition to mimic, then the behavior of the leader is crucial as it will be mimicked, good or bad.

In their work on robotics, Breazeal, Buchsbaum et al. (2005) explore the mental processes for a robot to understand the mental states of others based only on observable behavior. This competence has been called the theory of mind (TOM) (Premack and Woodruff 1978), folk psychology (Gordon 1986), mind reading (Whiten and Byrne 1997), or social common sense (Meltzoff and Moore 1997). These abilities, according to the authors, are accomplished as treating others as conspecific - viewing others as being "like me" (Meltzoff and Brooks 2001). Perceiving similarities between oneself and others allows people to empathize with their social partners, and to predict the emotions, behaviors, and mental states of others. It also helps people to infer intent. Research has shown that producing a facial expression generally associated with an emotion is sufficient to elicit that emotion (Strack, Martin et al. 1988), which is one of the earliest forms of emotional empathy and social referencing. The desire or need to be part of a group, to feel that others in the group are "like-me," and to strive to emulate the actions, values, and deeds of a leader are again part of our humanness.

Hauser (2006) provides a broad review of the psychological clinical trials that have been performed on how people, and animals, come to develop moral beliefs and norms.

Hauser builds his concepts on a premise similar to the work of the linguist Noam Chomsky (1988), that there may be deep similarities between the development of language and morality. Hauser says that empathy moves as a form of contagion. This connects XLQ trust and empathy directly to the values of the leader.

Hauser's book is a very rich collection of clinical trials, and the limitations of this paper require that only a few examples be provided. Hauser points to the work of Johnson (2003) who found that twelve month old children display *joint attention,* socially important behavior of following the gaze of others. And, Hauser points to the work of Eisenberg, Losoya et al. (2003) who found that infants, in the first few hours of life, cry in response to hearing others as a rudimentary form of empathy. Hauser contends that people have a genetic, as well as social, disposition toward a sort of human moral imperative. A leader must build trust, and must establish a benchmark for values. The research again shows that people have an innate proclivity to emulate the physical and emotional actions and deeds of others.

Testing the Model in Practice
To test the XLQ model, in the context of TPO's and emulation, we looked at three large complex international projects located in three different countries: Thailand, China, and India. Mr. Srinivasan was involved on all three projects, and Dr. Grisham on the project in Thailand.

Project 1 -- Thailand
The primary project participants included a huge Thai governmental agency that was the customer, and provided overall design integration and construction on a US$1 billion power project. The other primary participant was a consortium of two USA firms and Japanese firm, who provided project management, design, supply, and commissioning services. There were numerous other international organizations involved in the project, but these participants functioned as part of the value chain for the primary participants. The customer established the structure and culture of the TPO, ad hoc, and assumed the authority of the lead project manager, but passed on the responsibilities to the consortium.

Through out the course of the execution of the project it was found that the consortium and the customer did not exhibit any cohesive TPO culture, and certainly did not displayed a sense of teamwork. Having failed to consider the flow of information and knowledge, the customer was left to grapple with the inadequacies of the TPO as follows:
- **Trust** - Trust was missing within and between all parties. As interactions with the customer grew the element of mistrust grew in the customer as well who at one point of time started dealing with consortium partners individually as if they were three different independent contractors to them. Needless to mention at the end of the project the mistrust among the participants had grown to such an extent that there huge claims and counterclaims which were discussed for years after the project completion as well.
- **Communications** - The inter-consortium meetings were acerbic and very confrontational, with each consortium member putting each other first, rather than the common goals of project in front. The same was the case for the customer. In such an atmosphere of mistrust, the flow of knowledge was effectively shut-off, and

each participant protected themselves by withholding information that they though could be used against them by the other participants.

- **Transformation** - The project faced "heavy weather" and it was only the huge reputations that each organization (giants in their own rights) wanted to protect that saw the project through at a considerable expense of resources rather than any great team work of the participating project organizations.
- **Power** – The customer retained power to make decisions and to set the course for the project with their sole goals and objectives in mind. Despite the development of a reservoir of referent power created by the consortium lead, it was inadequate to change the momentum of the project.
- **Empathy** – All primary parties did attempt to empathize with the other parties, but the bottom line overruled such attempts. Each party attempted to understand the other parties, but from the perspective of self-interest, and with the goal of setting tactics or strategy to win the monetary struggle.
- **Societal Culture** – The primary participants did a reasonable job of learning about the cultures of the primary participants, and the individuals in the organization. Most of the consortium field team members were experienced expats, who knew how to adapt to other cultures – cultural "black belts" (Grisham 2006b).
- **TPO Culture** – The customer expected to an extent that the consortium would simply adopt the ad hoc culture of the Thai governmental organization. This did not happen, and was a source of friction. It was expected by the Thai customer that the two USA giants forming the consortium would at least, by virtue of similar societal cultural background, have worked in cohesion. But here the organizational cultures were so different that the two could not meet eye to eye on many aspects. Within the same contract structure the two consortium partners worked in such diverse styles that it positively bewildered the customer at times.
- **Emulation** – The project manager for the customer, a Thai national, functioned as the lead PM, had many of the attributes described in the XLQ model. Culturally (societal) the Thai nationals not only deferred to him, but respected him and copied his behavior. We found that some of the less egocentric expatriate participants also copied his social behavioral skills. This helped to bridge over some of the inherent TPO structural and communication issues. Likewise on the side of the consortium, we had site managers who were respected and emulated by both the expatriate participants (British, American, Singaporean, Indian, etc.) and the Thai nationals. Despite all of this, however, the structure of the TPO and the disparate goals were too great for leadership alone to overcome and the project was not successful.

Project 2 - South Korea
This project, at US$1.4 billion, was a larger than the Thailand project, and followed it in sequence. The key project participants included huge organizations from Korea and USA for delivering the project to an autonomous power utility of Korea. The USA organization was the overall project leader handling project management, part supply, part construction, basic engineering, commissioning, overall performance, and etc. The Korean counterparts were handling the detailed design, design integration, part construction and commissioning of their supply of equipments. The customer established the structure of the TPO, and decided to be in charge of managing the entire project, including the consortium. The customer however eschewed any responsibility, and

failed to establish any appropriate authority/responsibility matrix for the other participants in the project. Also, the customer refused to accept any responsibility for the results of improper decisions taken by him, and expected the consortium to "make things right" on such occasions. Thus the culture was one of placing blame for improper actions on the other members of the project.

During the course of execution of the project it was found that the consortium members and the customer did not exhibit any semblance of any unified TPO. All participants were focused on internal goals and targets, and little team work was exhibited at least in the initial stages of the project. The customer established the TPO structure, but it was a failure because internally the customer could never come to terms with the fact that the consortium members were also key partners for project success rather being mere contractors. This, of course, was partially due to the hierarchical approach of the Korean social culture. The customer treated the consortium members as mere deliverers of errands or services. As such the project had to face the inadequacies of TPO detailed below:

- **Trust** – Mutual trust was missing, between the customer and the consortium partners and amongst the consortium partners themselves. The two Korean organizations despite a similar societal background could not trust each other and were always finding ways to try and push a piece of their scope of work to the other party. Together also they did not have much trust in the consortium leader. The consortium leader organization also displayed similar mistrust.
- **Communications** – The client consortium meetings were not very structured, and the communications were pretty vague at times. Knowledge flow between the participants was minimal, and the participants were hesitant to share information. The missing trust also did not help in loosening up the atmosphere to facilitate frank exchange of ideas to take place.
- **Transformation** – Being a very target driven society, the Korean participants wanted to push the progress more vigorously despite differences of opinion and mistrust among the parties. The USA organization also was very conscious of schedule because of its reputation, and because of the additional risk for costs associated with project delays. These similar views ensured the project would be done ahead of schedule. While each participant was a large complex company, at the project level the consortium leadership was able to work out some understanding between the consortium partners, customers etc. so that all worked to meet the schedule. The site teams displayed the vision necessary to bridge the cultural and contractual differences.
- **Power** – The customer felt he was most powerful, and could dictate to the consortium. The other partners large firms not accustomed to being dictated to by others, thus they could not accept instructions from the customer which were not "reasonable" and explicitly set forth in the contract. This led to tense relations between the customer and the contractor. Within the consortium, the Korean partners felt that the consortium leader was taking a "big brother" attitude and did not have the interest of junior partners in mind. The site project leadership took extra care and communications to at least dispel some of these fears in the minds of the partners for a better team work.
- **Empathy** – The participants empathized to each other on an individual basis, but organizational constraints prevented them from empathizing on larger plane which in turn could have improved the trust factor to a great extent.

- **Societal Culture-** The project participants did a good job of understanding the societal cultures, and the individual personalities of the participants. Many of the consortium members were mature and well versed in being sensitive to the other's cultural requirements. This did help to bring about some sort of team spirit towards the later part of the project. This was also instrumental in the project being done well ahead of schedule despite the difficulties encountered.
- **TPO Culture** – The customer and junior partners of the consortium, being from the same Korean background, believed that some amount of interface would be achieved in a cordial atmosphere. However, the customer by virtue of being a very renowned power utility, tried to exercise a master-servant attitude towards the Korean consortium partners. By extension, the customer tended to extend similar behavior towards the consortium lead. The consortium lead, being strongly steeped in western organizational culture, could not accept the same. Likewise the customer could not accept the view point of the consortium lead, especially when they ran counter to his wishes. Amongst the two consortium partners (both being giant organizations of Korea) it was expected that a better relationship and unified team approach would be exhibited than was the case. However, the organizational cultural differences of the two partners were so large that they tended to believe that each one was trying to make a fast buck at the cost of the other. The scope split between the two members as engineered by the consortium lead was a very contentious issue where each party tried to push some of their scope in to the others territory. Thus the culture of the TPO was designed to be contentious by contract, and suffered from intransigent corporate cultural differences.
- **Emulation** – Consortium leadership at the site project level had the good sense to understand that the contentiousness was possibly due to a mismatch of the organizational cultures of the participants, and not any willful intention to cheat each other. Good XLQ attributes were practiced by the site leadership to organize a series of open communications amongst the members to clear the air, and to make each other conscious of the cultural disparities, both societal and organizational. This helped a lot and towards the later stage of the project the Korean partners tended to approach each other differently, and at times even bailed each other out to ensure project progress. As the project took off the customer leadership also came to terms with the consortium leadership's XLQ attributes and started treating them on a more equal footing leading to better working atmosphere and partial eradication of mistrust. While at a site level on a case to case basis some sort of trust could be established, on an organizational level mistrust still existed to a large extent.

Project 3 - China
This project had a different structure from the first two discussed, and it followed the Korean project. On this project there were four different customers, all Chinese but different organizations with different corporate cultures. The project cost was approximately US$ 2 billion, and the key project participants included very large organizations from China and the USA. The USA organization was the lead in project management, equipment supply, engineering, and technical support in commissioning support and overall performance. The Chinese counterpart (a joint venture between a US and Chinese organizations) had engineering, factory testing, part supply and local liaison responsibility. There were of course numerous other international organizations which

functioned as a part of the value chain for the primary participants.

The customer provided the overall design integration and construction and commissioning support. The customer determined the structure of the TPO and wanted to act as the project lead, but they were unwilling to take responsibility of the position. So the TPO did not function as a well oiled machine. Lack of team work, a sense of mistrust, and air of assumed authority without matching responsibility confronted the project. The situation got more complicated as the project was very aggressively scheduled with an unrelenting China government was bent on further and further squeezing the milestone dates. The following shortcomings of TPO came to through observation during the execution of the project:

- **Trust** – There was a lack of trust between the customers and the contractors. The project leadership of the contractors had a distinct feeling that project proponent had a different agenda which was never openly shared. The customer on his part always felt that the US organization was only concerned about its bottom line and not sensitive enough to the customer needs. The project site leadership of the US organization tried to build customer trust in the consortium. This helped but was not totally adequate based on the huge disparity of the organizational cultures and internal agendas toward the project.
- **Communication** – There were no structured communication meetings. Many decisions were expected to be carried out without proper documentation and paper work, just by word of mouth. The lack of trust indicated earlier, further compounded matters. The organizational cultural differences between the Chinese way of doing things (largely informal especially when it suited them) and the western way of formal communications proved to be a significant barrier to communications. The Chinese being high context, and the US being low context.
- **Transformation** – The customer was facing an ultimatum from the Chinese government forcing them to incredibly shorten the schedule from time to time. The US project contractor was pushed into meeting the ever shortening targets without any added compensation for the extra work and premium time required to do so, and this led to acidic confrontations. However, the market dynamics of China (the promise of huge business potential for the US giant) prompted the consortium to support the customer demands even at the cost of dwindling project bottom line. As such a sort of uncomfortable understanding to work to some common goal evolved.
- **Power** – The customer felt they were most powerful, that they could dictate to the consortium. This was not favorably responded by the US counterparts, and led to confrontations and a non congenial working relationship between the customer and the contractor. Interestingly, at times people unconnected to the TPO or project directly, but fairly powerful in the Chinese culture, were called to mediate in an informal fashion. The attempts were to enact a settlement and come to some conclusion on the disputes. It is also equally interesting to note that the US organizations, which initially scoffed and ridiculed this as unprofessional, also followed suit. They used a similar model by employing its fairly influential contacts in the Chinese hierarchy to speak and push for resolution in their favor.   This is a reflection of societal cultural adjustment of the consortium, with regards to their western values and practices, to a Chinese approach. This is also an example of how the consortium emulated their Chinese counterparts culture.

- **Empathy** – The Chinese customer was culturally very empathetic to the foreign expats involved in the project. However, this was limited to societal cultures of the individuals at site. Organizational cultural constraints pulled the groups apart and prevented a complete empathetic team work.
- **Societal Cultural** – The Chinese customer took great pains to understand the culture of the expats, and played the genial host as far as socializing was concerned. The consortium's expat leadership was also well matured and reciprocated the cultural understanding of its Chinese counterparts. This helped in thawing the frigid TPO relations from time to time.
- **TPO Culture-** The customer being used to submissive responses from their usual Chinese contractor's, initially expected the same treatment from the US consortium. The consortium however, had a strong sense (possibly misplaced) of being more knowledgeable and superior to the customer. Often this led to a sort of tussle, and conflict of leadership, between the customer and the consortium.
- **Emulation** – The project leadership of the US consortium was able to practice requisite XLQ attributes to engage the customer in meaningful communication within the contract such that the view points of both side could be presented in a more respectable fashion. This was instrumental in building up somewhat more cohesive team work, based on less mistrust. This helped move the project forward, but was not adequate to overcome the organizational mistrust between the client and the consortium. It had only some tempering effect at the local project level to move things forward. The Chinese leadership was less vocal and not effective communicators in project meetings. However, they were focused on some immediate targets (at times seemingly short term in nature), and pushed for these displaying the typical approach of a "high-context" culture. This was of course the opposite of the "low-context" approach of the US consortium leadership which was far more direct and blatant in their communications. During one of many informal sessions with them, I had queried as to why they were at times hell bent on pushing for things which were not critical. I was baffled at the simplicity of the answer "one less thing to worry about when everything goes critical towards the end." In their own way, they copied our US type leadership qualities when the going was good. This was a positive effect, and was copied by the participants. It helped to divert the participants attention from the intransigent project complexities, and provided a respite to get simpler things resolved.

The Chinese leadership was initially bemused with our approach of elaborate reasoning and communications to get the buy in of the TPO members. They thought this to be an unnecessary waste of time (I personally believe they thought this would dilute the leader's authority) especially as they thought that the team can be simply instructed to do certain things. Pains were taken to explain the philosophy that a team committed who commit themselves to a task voluntarily, is likely to yield better results with less monitoring and supervision. It took some time to sink in, but towards the end of my assignment I could feel that they were beginning to adopt a more participatory approach to management. Patience and persistence on my part provided adequate time for them to see the benefits, and emulate a more western approach.

Conclusion

Social research has proven that people imitate others beginning almost at birth, and research on the brain is beginning to show that people may in fact be "wired" from birth to imitate the actions of others, both good and bad. As people we watch others, and emulate their actions, and what we perceive to be their intentions. There has not been much cross-cultural clinical work, but the existing body of research points toward a genetic like capacity of all humans to imitate.

For a project manager leading a cross-cultural team, the dimensions of XLQ are integrally linked with imitation. If the team trusts the leader implicitly, then they will be inclined to copy her behavior, readily. The display of empathy and transformation, and the emulation of both, will serve not only to increase the stature of the leader in the eyes of the followers, but will also create a spiral of teamwork and esprit de corps. It will also enhance the referent power of the leader, leading to even greater and enduring trust.

The research on imitation has also shown that people intuit the meaning of the intentions from the actions of others. Of course the intentions can be misunderstood, which can lead to a diminution of trust among other things. Fortunately, through trial and error, the followers can test their assumptions against the actual intentions of the leader who is open, and listens actively; a leader who is a good communicator. This can in turn lead to communications at a more subtle level, offering a richer more effective means of transferring tacit knowledge within the team.

A leader with high XLQ can leverage her or his effectiveness by setting the example for others to follow, what Chartrand and Barg (1999) call the chameleon effect. The examples provided above offer practical evidence that effective XLQ behavior is in fact copied, even under the most challenging contractual and cultural circumstances. XLQ cannot overcome a TPO structure that separates parties, nurtures mistrust, minimizes communications, and places individual gain above the goals and objectives of the project. What XLQ can do in these circumstances, as demonstrated above, is to mitigate the negative effects of a poorly designed TPO. That is significant.

Future Research
The research on XLQ provided the dimensions of cross-cultural leadership, and their connection to cultural values and norms. Field research is now needed to establish metrics for each dimension. The ability of organizations to utilize the XLQ model will depend upon the ability to determine existing cross-cultural leadership skills and attributes to a known benchmark. To establish the benchmark requires measuring the dimensions of leaders in multiple cultural environments.

Other research is needed to undertake a study of the ways to enhance each XLQ dimension for those who need to improve their ability to lead cross-cultural teams.

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tested in 3-person groups representing prototypes of the nuclear family. In 1 condition an adult assumed the role of controller of positive reinforcers. Another adult was the consumer of these resources, while the child, a participant O in the triad, was essentially ignored. In a 2nd treatment condition, one adult controlled the rewarding resources; the child, however, was the recipient of the positive reinforcers, while the other adult was assigned a subordinate and powerless role. Following the experimental social interactions the 2 adult models exhibited divergent patterns of behavior in the presence of the child, and a measure was obtained of the degree to which the child subsequently patterned his behavior after that of the models. Children imitated primarily the model who possessed rewarding power rather than the competitor for the rewards. Moreover, power inversions on the part of the male and female models produced cross-sex imitation, particularly in girls. (21 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved)

Breazeal, C., D. Buchsbaum, et al. (2005). "Learning From and About Others: Towards Using Imitation to Bootstrap the Social Understanding of Others by Robots." Artificial Life **11**(1/2): 31-62.
> We want to build robots capable of rich social interactions with humans, including natural communication and cooperation. This work explores how imitation as a social learning and teaching process may be applied to building socially intelligent robots, and summarizes our progress toward building a robot capable of learning how to imitate facial expressions from simple imitative games played with a human, using biologically inspired mechanisms. It is possible for the robot to bootstrap from this imitative ability to infer the affective reaction of the human with whom it interacts and then use this affective assessment to guide its subsequent behavior. Our approach is heavily influenced by the ways human infants learn to communicate with their caregivers and come to understand the actions and expressive behavior of others in intentional and motivational terms. Specifically, our approach is guided by the hypothesis that imitative interactions between infant and caregiver, starting with facial mimicry, are a significant stepping-stone to developing appropriate social behavior, to predicting others' actions, and ultimately to understanding people as social beings.

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> Project-based enterprises challenge several tenets of current strategic management theory. In the case of the film-making industry, it is unclear how film-making strategy and its implementation relates to industry participants' prior film experience. In particular, it is still unclear how industry and career processes influence and are influenced by successive project-based enterprise activities. This article describes field research into the creation of an independently produced UK-US feature film. The evidence from the film industry calls for strategic management theory to incorporate a dynamic, multi-community perspective into the mainstream of its ideas. The evidence further suggests that the perspective needs to be sensitive to shifting combinations of human and social capital, and the further evolution of these through people's career investments.

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> Organizations are changing rapidly as they search for effective forms to take them into the next century. These new forms will provide both opportunities and threats for project managers. New style projects will be important within an organizational context that will increasingly be based on informal, boundary spanning networks. This will spawn new roles that will compete with that of the project manager, and requirements for new skills and mindsets. It will also require the organization to create new enabling mechanisms to support the new project managers and team members. All these strands will be integrated through the

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Henrie, M. and A. Sousa-Poza (2005). "Project Management: A Cultural Literary Review." <u>Project Management Journal</u> **36**(2): 5-14.
> The project management literature published over the past 50 years has repeatedly identified time, budget, and quality as the criteria for defining project success or failure. What this literature also found was that project outcome is often determined by the people realizing the project, by their professional and personal skills and experience, by their distinct cultural backgrounds-ancestral, social, organizational. This paper examines the attention the recent literature devotes to cultural identity. It first surveys the expanse of previously published research on project management culture before outlining the methods and criteria used in this study, an effort which analyzed abstracts of 514 culture-related papers published in International Journal of Project Management (IJPM), 256 culture-related papers published in Project Management Journal (PMJ), and 93 books on project management culture recognized by the Library of Congress. After reviewing these sources, this paper identifies the most popular topics discussed in this literature, recognizes the limitations of conducting this review, and details the lessons learned. This paper concludes by suggesting how researchers and practitioners can develop culture-based theories and research methods. It also lists the 21 search terms the authors used to identity potential culture-related literature sources when they were conducting their content analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Iacoboni, M., I. Molnar-Szakacs, et al. (2005). "Grasping the intentions of others with one's own mirror neuron system." <u>Plos Biology</u> **3**(3 (Electronic)): e79.
> Understanding the intentions of others while watching their actions is a fundamental building block of social behavior. The neural and functional mechanisms underlying this ability are still poorly understood. To investigate these mechanisms we used functional magnetic resonance imaging. Twenty-three subjects watched three kinds of stimuli: grasping hand actions without a context, context only (scenes containing objects), and grasping hand actions performed in two different contexts. In the latter condition the context suggested the intention associated with the grasping action (either drinking or cleaning). Actions embedded in contexts, compared with the other two conditions, yielded a significant signal increase in the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus and the adjacent sector of the ventral premotor cortex where hand actions are represented. Thus, premotor mirror neuron areas-areas active during the execution and the observation of an action-previously thought to be involved only in action recognition are actually also involved in understanding the intentions of others. To ascribe an intention is to infer a forthcoming new goal, and this is an operation that the motor system does automatically.

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    Focuses on Gabriel Tarde, who lived fron 1843 to 1904, and his contribution to diffusion research. Definition of diffusion; Tarde's contribution to criminology and social interaction theory; Tarde's view concerning social change; Details on Tarde's work on diffusion.
Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904) has given significant contributions to criminology, to social interaction theory and to diffusion research. Diffusion refers to spreading of social or cultural properties from one society or environment to another. Tarde created his own system of sociology, based on psychology and de signed to explain the whole of social behaviour from development of cultures to acts of an individual. In his view social change requires penetration of inventions that diffuse through the process of imitation. People imitate beliefs and desires or motives transmitted from one individual to another. Analysis should take place on a micro-level with the method he called 'interpsychology'. Tarde refuted the idea of a social whole being more than its parts, He thought at least to some extent like a reductionist. Moreover, imitation as a social phenomenon was in Tarde's view net isolated from other activities in nature but a part of a universal law of repetition. His professional experiences in court apparently directed his interest towards criminology, affected his thinking about motives and about the level of analysis. Tarde's ontological ideas were soon disregarded largely due to the criticism presented by Emile Durkheim (1858-1916). However, Tarde made quite a few insightful and practical observations that have benefited diffusion research. Likewise, aspects similar to Tarde's thoughts concerning cultural evolution seem to interest modern scientists.

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> The nature of the project as a temporary organization is analysed from the perspective of organizational theory. This leads to a reassessment of the definition of a project. It is suggested that classical definitions of projects are not wrong, just incomplete. The project as a temporary organization is viewed here as a production function, as an agency for assigning resources to the management of change within the functional organization, and as an agency for managing

uncertainty. The role of the project manager is also considered. The project manager is chief executive of the temporary organization, and thus their roles in objective setting and motivating team members are emphasized over their role in planning and executing work. Second, as manager of the agency, they are the agent of the owner (principal) and so a second hierarchy of management and control must be put in place to monitor their performance. These agency costs add to the cost of the project, but may also explain why professional recognition is so important to project managers. Copyright 2003 Elsevier Copyright of International Journal of Project Management is the property of Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts)

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